safeshare
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The fingerprint is baked into the URL. Anyone who reads the link can verify the sender — but so can a snoop on the channel that carries it.

Whoever opens this link can receive the secret, so send it only to the intended person. It stops admitting new receivers in 5 min; a fresh link is generated after that.

0 B / 1.00 MB · server relayEstimate: 5 sec (tier baseline ~5 sec)
Encryption — keeps the contents secret

Key-encapsulation algorithms from different mathematical families. All their secrets are combined, so an attacker has to break every active one to read anything.

  • Lattice-basedwiki↗3 / 3 active

    Hard problems over module/NTRU lattices (LWE, SIS). NIST PQC primary track.

    • Crystals KyberFastKEMActive~0.3 sModule-LWE (ML-KEM / FIPS 203).
    • NtruFastKEMActive~0.2 s receiver keygenNTRU ring-LWE.
    • FrodoKEM-976FastKEMActive~0.1 sFrodoKEM-976-AES — plain LWE (no ring/module structure); ISO standard.
  • Code-basedwiki↗0 / 2 active

    Decoding random linear codes (McEliece). Decades of cryptanalysis, large keys.

    • HQC-256MediumKEMNot used~0.3 sHQC-256 — quasi-cyclic codes; NIST round-4 backup KEM (selected 2025).
    • McElieceHighKEMNot used4–19 s receiver keygenClassic McEliece, binary Goppa codes.
  • Hash-basedwiki↗none available

    Security reduces to a collision-resistant hash. Conservative, large signatures.

    Hash functions can only build signatures — there is no practical hash-based public-key encryption.

  • Multivariatewiki↗none available

    Solving systems of multivariate quadratic equations over finite fields.

    No multivariate encryption scheme has survived cryptanalysis; the family is only used for signatures.

  • Isogeny-basedwiki↗none available

    Walks on supersingular isogeny graphs. Compact keys; SIDH/SIKE were broken in 2022.

    SIKE, the isogeny KEM, was broken classically in 2022. Nothing safe to add.

  • Classical (pre-quantum)wiki↗0 / 1 active

    ECDH / Ed25519. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a large quantum computer; only useful paired with a PQ scheme.

    • HPKENo tierHybrid PKEDisabled~10 msDisabled: P-256 ECDH is broken by Shor's algorithm on a large quantum computer.
Sender authentication — proves it came from you

Every transfer is signed with each active signature algorithm, and the receiver requires all of them to verify. The fingerprint below covers every signing key, so a forger has to break every active algorithm.

Changing this changes the fingerprint and the share link; links you already sent stop working.

  • Lattice-basedwiki↗2 / 3 active

    Hard problems over module/NTRU lattices (LWE, SIS). NIST PQC primary track.

    • Dilithium CrystalsFastSignatureAlways on~60 ms per signatureModule-LWE / Module-SIS (ML-DSA / FIPS 204). Always on.
    • Falcon CryptoFastSignatureActive~0.1 s per signatureNTRU lattice, fast-Fourier sampling (FN-DSA / FIPS 206 draft).
    • SuperdilithiumMediumSignatureNot used~30 ms per signatureDilithium + Ed25519 in one signature. The Ed25519 half is quantum-breakable; the Dilithium half is not.
  • Code-basedwiki↗none available

    Decoding random linear codes (McEliece). Decades of cryptanalysis, large keys.

    Code-based signatures (CROSS, LESS) are still NIST candidates; not implemented.

  • Hash-basedwiki↗0 / 2 active

    Security reduces to a collision-resistant hash. Conservative, large signatures.

    • SphincsHighSignatureNot used~14 s per signatureSPHINCS+ (SLH-DSA / FIPS 205). Relies only on hash functions.
    • Super SphincsUltra HighSignatureNot used~14 s per signatureSPHINCS+ + Ed25519 in one signature. The Ed25519 half is quantum-breakable; the SPHINCS+ half is not.
  • Multivariatewiki↗1 / 1 active

    Solving systems of multivariate quadratic equations over finite fields.

    • MAYO-5FastSignatureActive~40 ms per signatureMAYO-5 — UOV-based multivariate signature; NIST additional-signatures round.
  • Isogeny-basedwiki↗none available

    Walks on supersingular isogeny graphs. Compact keys; SIDH/SIKE were broken in 2022.

    SQIsign is still a NIST candidate; not implemented.

  • Classical (pre-quantum)wiki↗0 / 2 active

    ECDH / Ed25519. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a large quantum computer; only useful paired with a PQ scheme.

    • SuperdilithiumMediumSignatureNot used~30 ms per signatureDilithium + Ed25519 in one signature. The Ed25519 half is quantum-breakable; the Dilithium half is not.
    • Super SphincsUltra HighSignatureNot used~14 s per signatureSPHINCS+ + Ed25519 in one signature. The Ed25519 half is quantum-breakable; the SPHINCS+ half is not.
Signing identity fingerprint
generating…

Same form baked into the share link.

When to switch: the URL form goes wherever the link goes — if you're forwarding the link through email, chat, or a server you don't fully trust, an attacker on that channel sees the fingerprint and can't be caught swapping it. Pick Numeric or Alphanumeric when you can read the code aloud in a meeting, on a call, or in person; the link stays clean and the verification check moves to a channel the attacker isn't on.

Send is disabled until the receiver joins.